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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the last 10 years, global energy landscape has been significantly transformed. 
The natural gas market has experienced one of the most significant metamorphoses. New 
supply sources and cheaper technology provided conditions necessary to the advent of 
large scale trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), and led to less localized market with lower 
price differentials globally. This change has been particularly consequential in Europe 
where concerns about over-dependence on Russian energy have been raised repeatedly 
by countries that have relied on Russian gas either for majority or their entire gas demand. 
LNG offers an alternative to diversify sources and routes of supply though effectiveness 
of this solution is yet to be established. 
 As one of countries dependent on Russia for significant portion of gas supply, 
Poland has quickly recognized the need to diversify supply sources by introducing LNG 
as a way to increase its energy security. The country decided to invest in the LNG receiving 
terminal in Swinoujscie. As one of the first LNG terminals in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Swinoujscie can provide a useful benchmark for future investments in the LNG sector and 
has the potential to become a key determinant of the role of LNG in the energy mix of the 
region.  
 The terminal has been aimed at increasing energy security by diversifying natural 
gas supply away from Russia. These goals, together with supplementing “the broader 
trans-European energy network,” “stimulating regional growth, competitiveness and 
investment, and reducing CO2 emissions in Poland” were underlined in justification of 
investment decision by international financial institutions such as EBRD and financial 
mechanisms of the European Union including the European Investment Bank, and the 
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EU’s two programs: European Energy Programme for Recovery and Operational 
Programme Infrastructure and Environment (EBRD 2012). 
 In this study I aim at assessing whether and/or to what extent these goals were 
achieved. I analyze legal documents and compare the international definitions of energy 
security to the definition spelled out in the Polish law: “a state that allows meeting its 
current and prospective demand in a way that is justified from a technological and 
economical point of view and complies to environmental standards” (Art. 3 p.16 of Energy 
Law 1997). Based on these, I identify three main criteria of energy security: 
diversification, affordability and reliability. In this context, using publicly available data 
on gas imports, and signed contracts, I analyze the impact of opening of the Swinoujscie 
terminal on Polish energy security. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A Natural Gas 
 Natural gas has been a vital component of the world’ energy mix but its importance 
is expected to burgeon over the next decades. With 2018 data showing global energy 
demand growing at its fastest pace in the last decade, natural gas was a primary 
beneficiary and accounted for almost half of the rise in the consumption (IEA, 2019). 
Globally, natural gas currently accounts for 22% of the energy mix, as it competes with 
coal for the position of the second (after oil) most important energy resource. We know 
that natural gas is destined to win this battle, thanks to its environmental advantage 
relative to coal. Natural gas is generally associated with better air quality and lower 
greenhouse gas emissions than other fossil fuels, and can act as a bridge for renewables 
in the high demand low supply times of the day. As a result, some experts predict that 
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Europe specifically will enter a golden age of gas within the next 5 years (Bowlus 2019). 
In the developing world, countries will also turn toward natural gas as increasing energy 
demand exacerbates the conflict between climate issues and use of fossil fuels. With 
higher economic development, increasing number of countries led by China will be 
switching towards cleaner energy sources that have smaller local pollutions and 
contribute less to smog, including gas. This has become possible thanks to globalization 
of the natural gas market that has taken place over the last decade and that we expect to 
deepen going forward.  
 Historically natural gas market has been highly localized and regional in nature. 
Unlike oil - a high density liquid that was easy to transport globally, natural gas is much 
more difficult to store and distribute. The gaseous form and relatively low caloric value 
requires a system of pipeline infrastructure (Brown and Yucel 2009). Given the amount 
of investment needed, long-term, oil-indexed contracts have been the norm (Zeniewski 
2019). Moreover, most typical clauses included were very rigid and unfavorable for the 
buyers, such as point-to-point delivery and very high take-or-pay.1 All this has limited the 
market both in size and in diversity of suppliers and made it possible for Russian 
monopoly to in certain European markets to emerge.  
However, the paradigm has shifted dramatically in the recent years as new supplies 
and cheaper technology have led a move towards more global natural gas market. In 
particular this relates to the Shale Revolution in the United States driven by 
advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing boosted global supplies 
significantly above historical expectations (API 2014). Resulting oversupply put 
                                               
1 For more information, see Incoterms evolution history: https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-
business/incoterms-rules/incoterms-rules-history/ 
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downward pressure on gas prices in the United States and arbitrage opportunities abroad 
(Stevens 2012). Competition to seize this opportunity, coupled by particularly intensive 
developments in Australia (expected to become biggest LNG exporter by 2020 according 
to Wisniewski, 2017) later on, led to more investment in technology and aided already 
growing market of liquefied natural gas (Hartley 2013). Cost efficient liquefaction led to 
an increase in global export and import capacities and rise in trade - accounting for one 
third of global gas trade as per 2017 IEA statistics.2  
 Better prices and contracts have created a competitive environment that promotes 
LNG usage in different industries and attracts various players. Some of them include 
“industrial gas consumption, LNG usage in maritime and road transport, as well as small-
scale LNG” (Bieliszczuk 2017). The importance and irreversibility of these developments 
have only been confirmed by the recent investment in LNG infrastructure by Russian 
government and a case of Novatek. A Russian LNG firm has been supported by the federal 
government, despite the fact the country historically profited from and tried to discourage 
LNG trade for traditional pipeline infrastructure to maintain its competitive advantage in 
the gas market (Kardas 2018). 
 These developments affected types of deals arranged and prices making the LNG 
market more dynamic. Point-to-point deliveries of gas are being challenged by various 
intermediaries and destination-flexible contracts that allow reselling (Zeniewski 2019). 
Moreover, some contract structures like Delivery Ex Ship (DES) directly transfer costs of 
delivery on the seller. A move away from high values of Annual Contract Quantities 
(ACQs) in take-or-pay contracts means the revenue stream for seller is no longer 
                                               
2 https://www.iea.org/statistics/naturalgas/ 
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guaranteed and buyer and seller now share more of a quantity risk - it is more elastic and 
responsive to the actual demand. With the development of the market, alternative clauses 
become more popular too: take-and-pay and take-or-cancel have all different 
consequences for both sides involved, however more flexibility generally allows for 
greater specialization in the market.3 Actors in the market now face alternatives to long-
term contracts depending on their risk preference: short-, medium-term and those based 
on the spot market (Zeniewski 2019). As a result, global energy market consists of a 
deeper, more liquid, and more flexible market than ever before, and while there is still a 
long way before one price for the LNG market, the price differentials across continents 
have converged.  
LNG Price Differentials   GRAPH 1. 
 
 Source: IEA data https://www.iea.org/statistics/naturalgas/ accessed on 
5/6/2019 
 
                                               
3 For a more detailed analysis of the consequences for involved partners, see Rogers and Hwang, 2017  
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More globalized market creates a paradox for energy security. As a result of these changes, 
non-traditional suppliers of the resource, such as United States can now promote their 
interests through participating in the market, and importing countries can diversify their 
providers (Senate 2018). But while access to other supply sources may be the only way to 
diversify for some countries, generally bigger interdependence of the system make the 
risk greater for the rest of the world to bear the consequences of shocks previously limited 
to the local receivers (OECD/IEA 2018).  
 
B Energy Security in Europe 
 EU’s own supplies are unsatisfactory to meet the energy demand. Based on the 
European Commission estimates, domestic energy production, including natural gas 
production, is expected to drop over time, in 2040 reaching 50% of 2020 volumes and 
only 25% of 2000 volumes. Simultaneously, demand should stabilize around 1500 ktoe 
(EC, 2016) Shale gas extraction is much more challenging than in the United States. 
European countries with significant shale gas supplies faces a whole array of barriers to 
entry. Biggest European countries like France and Germany have significant shale 
resources yet decided to ban extraction. Other policy challenge faces firms in Romania, 
characterized by weaker institutions and legal frameworks that do not provide similar 
incentives to extracting corporations as the American legal system does. Companies in 
Poland face complex geological conditions and hence costly devilment prospects 
discouraging international capital.4  
                                               
4 Among geological conditions, experts distinguish much deeper shale location, thinner shale plays, low 
permeability and lower share of organic carbon that as a result increase costs. Subsequently, business 
composition of firms granted concessions comprised of a few large international and state-owned 
conglomerates quite a different story than drilling led by independent small operators drilling on small 
areas in the US. Moreover, other barriers included very bureaucratic concession application process, 
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Most diversification efforts concern anti-monopolistic legislation and financial 
resources aimed at strengthening the internal market. So-called energy packages with the 
most recent from 2011, introduced legal reforms to promote unbundling of transmission 
assets (ownership) and certification of transmission system operators (TSO). The goal of 
the directive is to promote internal market and cooperation between the operators. In 
doing so the regulation aims at achieving the following results: efficiency gains, 
competitive prices, higher standard of service and contribute to security of supply and 
sustainability (EP 2009). In the same line, most of the funding capabilities offered 
through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) provide financial support to the “projects 
of common interest” entailing mostly reverse flow projects. It is worth noting however, 
that according to some experts, the CEF is severely underfunded relatively to the EU’s 
energy infrastructure investment needs (Collins and Mikulska 2018). 
Geographical and economic conditions make some European countries especially 
prone to the Russian influence - the biggest energy exporter to the EU.5 As noted by 
experts from the Polish Institute of International Affairs and Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs, “historically, the first economic problem recognized as potentially 
undermining state security— following the oil crises of the 1970s—was disruption of 
access to energy resources” (PIIA and NIIA 2018). The energy security issue is of great 
importance within the European Union as many of its members have relied on Gazprom 
- a state-owned Russian company, to satisfy majority if not entirety of their natural gas 
                                               
short duration of concessions, and state ownership of mineral rights, (based on A. Mikulska’s 
presentation at International Law Section conference in Mexico City, April 3-6, 2019) 
5 Second biggest exporter to the EU is Norway. While it is seen by many a stable source of supply of gas 
that can be delivered through the pipeline infrastructure, it cannot possibly deliver all gas that is needed 
not only in Western Europe and there is also the concern that Norwegian supplies are waning (OIES 
2018, compare with NPD’s production forecasts available here: 
https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/production-forecasts/) 
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demand. Gazprom has a particularly strong position in the Central Eastern Europe (CEE). 
As a result of geography of these countries, there is not enough domestic resources to 
satisfy their energy needs, so the Russian infrastructure has for many years been the only 
viable supply option. Historically, countries of the former Soviet bloc were either 
connected to “the Soviet Union’s internal gas system (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) or 
hooked up to shipments of Soviet raw materials (Poland)” (PIIA and NIIA 2018). Strong 
economic growth experienced by the countries of the region suggest increase in energy 
demands. The reliance has hence been growing. Between the early 1990s and 2017, 
Russia’s overall volume of gas sales to the area rose by more than 50% (based on Gazprom 
data quoted in PIIA and NIIA 2018). Currently, 6 out of top 10 countries with the highest 
Gazprom dependency coming from this region. Given an official document of Russian 
Federation explicitly states that one of the strategic goals of natural gas development is 
“securing Russian political interests in Europe” this could pose potential threats (“Energy 
Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020” cited in PIIA and NIIA 2018). According to an 
analysis by PIIA and NIIA (2018), Russia has a vested interest in the region, and the 
Federation’s goal is “to effectively limit (…) freedom of choice (…), strategic cooperation 
with selected partners (especially the U.S.), and structural, market-oriented reform of the 
economy, especially in the energy sector.” An expert’s conservative approach identifies 15 
“discrete instances where Russian entities used price and physical volume manipulation 
of crude oil or natural gas supplies—often amid political tensions—to pressure consumers 
located in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet countries ” since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (Collins 2017).  
 As a result, a compelling argument for diversification can be and is often made by 
political leaders in these countries. Hinchey (2018) cites three main reasons for the 
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diversification away from the Russian gas: one purely economic and two more 
geopolitical. First, the CEE countries generally have to pay higher more for Russian gas 
than other Western European countries. Second, there is a widespread anxiety against 
Russia using its hegemonic position as a “weapon” to achieve its geopolitical goals, as it 
was the case in Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 (Collins 2017). Third, according to Hinchey 
(2018), CEE countries watch very closely developments such as Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
to Germany and expect closer ties between Western Europe and Russia to result in a 
weakened “willingness to stand up to Russian interference” in the region.  
On its part, Russia does not give up its strong position as a gas supplier to Europe. 
It has already lowered prices in the region - wherever alternative supplies are accessible- 
and has pushed new infrastructural projects such as Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream 
that are advertised as diversifying infrastructure in terms of diversification of supply route 
that contributes to energy security. 
 It seems logical that under such conditions the CEE countries would be the most 
interested in diversifying their supply through importing LNG. However, as Hinchey and 
Mikulska (2017) point out, such a solution, while addressing geopolitical reasons, does 
not have to lead to lower prices for the region. Cost of importing LNG comprises of gas 
price, liquefaction, transportation and regasification, and makes it less competitive than 
Russian gas supplied through pipes. 
 A literature review on this topic reveals that the mere notion of competition, 
introduced by LNG import capabilities, is enough to lead to lower prices. As such “credible 
threat”, investment in LNG import facilities is sufficient to “incentivize Russia to cut 
prices long-term” (Hinchey and Mikulska 2017). Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2004) 
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go furthest in their conclusion, stating that presence of import terminals could change the 
nature of Russian supply contracts. 
 To the author’s best knowledge and intentions, there appears to be only one study 
that measures the impact of a particular receiving facility and hence increased access to 
alternative sources of natural gas on European gas prices - Hinchey’s study on the 
Lithuanian Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) “Independence”. Her model 
found that the price of Russian gas is inversely related to a ratio of non-Russian to Russian 
sources and the empirical data confirmed decreasing Russian gas prices (Hinchey, 2018). 
 
C Energy Security in Poland 
 Poland is probably the one representative of the CEE region with the strongest 
resolve to increase its energy security by diversifying its gas supplies away from Russian 
gas. Poland’s geology offers only limited domestic supplies of natural gas, insufficient to 
meet the energy demand. Economically, Poland has been experiencing remarkable 
progress, compared by some to the best epoch of more than a thousand year old country.6 
As Polish society has gotten richer, energy demand has also risen and is expected to 
continue to do so (Fitch 2018). 
Historically, Poland has relied on the network of pipelines inherited from the era 
Soviet Union era that, until recently, facilitated Russia’s dominant position as the only 
supplier of natural gas. This has geopolitical implications given Polish-Russian difficult 
history, including during and after the World War 2 and recent experiences of Russia 
using its gas capabilities to exercise its political interests through supply disruptions in 
2007 and 2014. The situation became exacerbated even more after 2014 Russian 
                                               
6 Cf. Piatkowski 2013 
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aggression against Ukraine with concerns about further geopolitically motivated 
incidents similar to those frequently experienced by other countries in the CEE region.7 
It should not come as a surprise, that according to the experts Poland “has long perceived 
dependence on Russian gas as not only been an economic but also a security threat (PIIA 
and NIIA 2018). The list of anti-competitive practices and political activity between 
1990–2017 includes: “re-export ban, non-market pricing, <conditional> gas shipments, 
threats to cut supplies in the event of gas sales to Ukraine” (PIIA and NIIA 2018).  
 As a result of the effort to bring in more energy security to the region, Poland 
decided to build and open an LNG-receiving terminal with the access to the Baltic Sea the 
Polish terminal was opened in Swinoujscie in 2015. Notably, as of 2019, the Terminal has 
had the highest-level utilization level in the entire EU (Central Europe Energy Partners 
2019). But is it enough?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Research Question  
                                               
7 For a full account see Collins 2017 
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 What was the impact of the LNG receiving terminal in Swinoujscie on Polish 
energy security? 
 
4. Hypothesis 
 As a result of opening the LNG receiving terminal in Swinoujscie Polish energy 
security increased. 
 
5. Methodology 
 In the paper I look at legal documents that define energy security in the 
international realm, according to the European Union framework, and in the light of 
Polish legal system. Based on these, I identify three main criteria of energy security: 
diversification, affordability and reliability. I follow with analysis of the impact of 
Swinoujscie terminal on each of the three aspects.  
 To assess the diversification criterion, I use PGNiG publicly available data on gas 
imports and exports and directions of the imports to determine whether Poland has met 
its legally binding diversification requirements. I further analyze this data to determine 
whether diversification has occurred and how dependence on imports has changed. 
 Because of unavailability of actual contracts’ details, to assess the affordability 
criterion, I look at publicly available data for gas prices in the Henry Hub and gas prices 
on Gazprom contracts. I compare them to different estimates of how much Poland has 
and is paying for its gas contracts and then to official speeches by members of the ministry 
of energy to get a sense of what could the potential impact on affordability be. 
To assess the reliability criterion, I look at historical developments of deals signed 
by PGNiG on gas shipments to the Swinoujscie terminal. This section culminates in RSE 
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index calculations to determine whether the Swinoujscie terminal made Polish energy 
more reliable.  
 
 
6. Energy security: definition and legal terms 
The International Energy Agency understanding of energy security as “the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” is a cornerstone for 
more complex national and pannational definitions across the world. Similarly, the US 
and other actors, including World Economic Forum present the energy security as 
ability of “households and businesses to accommodate disruptions of supply in energy 
markets.” (CBO 2012). More sophisticated definitions go beyond meeting strictly 
physical needs to encompassing technological, economic, political, and environmental, 
impacts of disruptions. In the recent years especially the need to accommodate the latter 
consequences has been a particularly growing trend. While the EU treats this issue as an 
important part of the energy policy, its European Energy Security Strategy from 2014 
lacks a clear definition. The European Commission uses three adjectives to refer to it: 
diverse, affordable, and reliable. According to the EU Institute for Security Studies, 
actions should be taken to lower the internal and external risks to energy systems, as 
well as making the systems more resilient (Dreyer and Stang 2013).  
 
Tools to increase the resilience.   TABLE 1. 
Tool Mechanism 
Markets Forces of demand and supply are allowed to 
correspond 
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Infrastructure Adequate production and transportation can 
occur 
Risk Management Systems Options for reserves, emergency planning 
and alternative supply routes are expanded 
Energy Suppliers “Diverse portfolio of energy suppliers” is 
maintained 
Energy Efficiency Demand is kept “under control” 
Source: Dreyer and Stang 2013 
 
The main document defining Polish energy policy is the Energy Law Bill from April 
1997. Additionally, the Council of Ministers sets the long term goals through “Polish 
Energy Policy Until…”  (PEP) roadmaps: in 2005 it published PEP2025, in 2009 
PEP2030, and in 2019 a project of PEP2040. 
“Programs” or “Policies” serving auxiliary role to PEP2025 outlining policy 
directions for particular subsectors were published between 2006–2007. While this 
approach provides detailed instructions to each subsector, an attachment to PEP2030 
“Assessment of the energy policy from 2005” criticizes this structure as too decentralized. 
The document notes that as a result of “some tasks planned within the energy policy were 
not fully implemented and enforcement of others did not follow accepted specifications” 
(Ministry of Economy 2009b). 
Goals for the energy policy and definition of energy security in Polish legislature 
correspond closely with its international analogues. The goal of the energy policy as 
defined by Polish law is provision of the energy security, the growth of economic 
competitiveness and energy efficiency, as well as environmental protection (Art. 3 p.16 
Energy Bill 1997). Specifically, following the energy security definition presented in Polish 
law, energy security is a state that allows meeting its current and prospective demand in 
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a way that is justified from a technological and economical point of view and complies to 
environmental standards.  
Further chapters of the same document introduce the notion of diversification of 
sources as one of the possible mechanisms in the toolkit. According to the Article 32 P 2 
concessions allowing for gas exchange with international actors are allowed only with 
“consideration to diversification and energy security. Any energy company dealing with 
natural gas international turnover is required to diversify foreign natural gas supply” 
(Energy Bill 1997). 
Over time, changes have been made to the law, so that it currently obliges the 
Council of Ministers to specify a minimum level of natural gas diversification and a 
detailed mechanism for measurement thereof for a period of at least 10 years. However, 
the Council can designate exceptions from the diversification requirement given existing 
infrastructure. 
So far, the minimum levels of diversification understood as maximum share of 
natural gas imported from one source have been announced twice (see the Table 2,3, and 
4). Moreover, the 2017 resolution updated the diversification measurement with a more 
specifically defined formula. 
 
 
 
Minimum Levels of Diversification   
 TABLE 2. 
Year/ 
Minimum 
diversificatio
n  
specifications 
200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
2000 
specification 
88% 88% 78% 78% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 70% 
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2017 
specification 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Based on: Council of Ministers, 2000; 2017 
Minimum Levels of Diversification, cd.   TABLE 3. 
Year/ 
Minimum 
diversification  
specifications 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
2000 
specification 
70% 70% 70% 70% 59% 59% 59% 59% 49% 49% 
2017 
specification 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 70% 70% 70% 70% 
Source: Based on: Council of Ministers, 2000; 2017 
Minimum Levels of Diversification, cd. II 
 TABLE 4. 
Year/ 
Minimum 
diversification  
specifications 
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
2000 
specifications 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2017 
specification 
70% 70% 33% 33% 33% 33% 
Source: Based on: Council of Ministers, 2000; 2017 
 
Additionally, Policy for the Natural Gas Industry [PNGI] from 2007 defines the energy 
security in the gas sector as “provision of continuous natural gas supply to consumers at 
possibly low prices” (Ministry of Economy 2007). The document also identifies general 
factors that should characterize a successful policy of energy security including: 
● “Gas supply diversification 
● Storage capabilities 
● Technical state and functionality of distribution and transmission systems 
● Domestic natural gas extraction growth rate 
● State governance of key transmission infrastructure 
● Quality of legal regulations in respect to infrastructure investments 
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● Quality of legal regulations in respect to the whole gas sector, especially in respect 
to activities concerning trade and storage, transmission and distribution of natural 
gas 
● Quality of legal regulations in respect to energy security, including anti-crisis 
mechanisms and procedures 
● Policies of European countries and European Commission in respect to energy 
security” (Ministry of Economy 2007). 
 
 
7. Overview of the Polish gas sector structure 
 
A Main actors 
After joining the EU in 2004, Poland undertook a series of structural 
transformations within the natural gas sector to fully comply with the new regulatory 
framework and additional Council of Ministers-led initiatives, specifically Program 
Restrukturyzacji i Prywatyzacji Polskiego Górnictwa Naftowego i Gazownictwa S.A. z 5 
października 2004 r [Program for restructuring and privatisation of PGNiG from October 
5, 2004]. The 2003/55/WE Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
outlined the end goal of changes happening between 2005–2007. The competitiveness of 
the internal gas market, was also supported by non-discriminatory access to the network 
of the transmission and distribution system operators. As a result of this process, Polish 
government unbundled, among others, transmission and distribution system operators 
from PGNiG and designated newly created GAZ-SYSTEM to be the transmission operator 
with the Treasury owning 100% shares. Despite the Council-accepted “Program for 
restructuring...” called for exploration and production segment of PGNiG to be unbundled 
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too, later the Council of Ministers’ rejected such possibility. PGNiG hold its IPO and 
debuted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange on October 20, 2005, with the Treasury keeping 
the majority shares (Ministry of Economy 2007). 
However, according to the Ministry of Economy documentation the Treasury did 
not act diligently enough to secure its important interests before the IPO (Ministry of 
Economy 2007). As a result, it lost its indirect control over shares of PGNiG’s 48%-owned 
daughter company, SGT EuRoPol Gaz SA - owner of the part of Yamal Pipeline located in 
Poland. Moreover, the ownership of strategic assets needed for GAZ-SYSTEM to operate 
effectively in the transmission business did not take place. As a result, GAZ-SYSTEM 
leases the assets from PGNiG based on a 17-year long deal, which generates additional 
costs. According to the argument, while economic gain was transferred into higher share 
prices of PGNiG and dividends, because GAZ-SYSTEM is not publicly traded and as 
aforementioned the Treasury enjoys 100% ownership in it the state was the ultimate net-
payee. Moreover, each future investment activity in the transmission system had to be 
negotiated between GAZ-SYSTEM and PGNiG, hindering the investment process. PNGI 
recommended in-kind dividends to the Treasury and effective transfer of ownership of 
the most important assets to the GAZ-SYSTEM to accommodate these mistakes.  
When discussing motivations for the reorganization, a later document assessing 
these policies added “preclusion of hostile takeover of strategic companies” to the 
introduction of competitive markets and alignment with the EU law (Ministry of Economy 
2009b). The document however, does not describe how effectively a split of a previously 
one fully state-owned consortium into two smaller companies and IPO of one of them 
could potentially minimize the risk of a hostile takeover. With that in mind it should be 
stated that despite PGNiG’s participation in the WSE, a possibility of a hostile takeover is 
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marginal nonetheless. Both PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM were recognized as “strategic” 
because of their impact on energy security, and were additionally considered as 
“significant” for public order public security based on a regulation of the Council of 
Ministers from December, 13 2005 Dz. U. Nr 260, poz. 2174. Hence it seems very unlikely 
that the Treasury would look forward to disposing more of its controlling shares. 
Ownership of PGNiG    GRAPH 2. 
 
Source: PGNiG website as of 12/31/2018 
 
The relatively newest participant of the market is Polskie LNG, which was founded 
as a daughter company of PGNiG in 2007. Ownership transformations followed to ensure 
compliance with the European law: in December 2008 100% of shares were acquired by 
GAZ-SYSTEM, and then in 2010 Polskie LNG became a public limited company (PLC). 
The company is the owner and operator of the President Lech Kaczynski's LNG Terminal 
in Swinoujscie. Its concession awarded by a national regulator Energy Regulatory Office 
71.88
28.12
% Shares
State Treasury Free float
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(URE) in 2016 for the liquefaction of natural gas and regasification of LNG in the facility 
will expire with the last day of 2030.8 
Polskie LNG is responsible for the following processes: 
● LNG unloading from the vessel at the unloading berth 
● LNG process storage in tanks 
● LNG regasification and send-out to the National Transmission System  
● LNG loading into road tankers and ISO tank containers 
 
B Security of supply and the need for the terminal 
 
I Domestic production able to satisfy only a piece of demand 
Historically, domestic extraction averaged 30% of the market or around 4 billion 
cubic meters (bcm). Majority of documented Polish sources of gas are concentrated in Niż 
Polski and tectonic foreland of Karpaty mountains (Kaliski et al. 2010). According to the 
“Assessment…” maintaining this ratio was the energy security goal for the natural gas 
(Ministry of Energy 2009b). As a result, exploration segment has been playing an 
important role for PGNiG strategy. The firm set its goal to renew its resources at 10% 
faster rate when compared to extraction increases. Moreover, it has been heavily involved 
internationally, including Norway, Denmark, but also Libya, Egypt, India and Pakistan 
with concession in just Libya exceeding Polish proven resources (Kaliski et al. 2010). 
Moreover, Baltic Pipe initiative connecting Norway and Denmark with Poland was 
                                               
8 Based on https://en.polskielng.pl/the-company/polskie-lng-sa-information-about-the-company/ 
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resumed in 2007, and is currently in the late phase of planning and has just received 
significant funding from the EU (EC 2019b). 
  
II Limited infrastructural capabilities led to dependence on Russia 
2007 PNGI is divided into 3 parts. The last section includes a program of action 
for improving the energy security” (Ministry of Economy 2007). It is particularly 
informative, because it analyzes the state of the Polish gas sector and puts it into an 
international perspective. The document compares the state of transmission network 
infrastructure in Poland with its counterparts in Belgium, France, Spain, Netherlands, UK 
and Italy. The picture is rather grim. The amount of annual natural gas send per 1 km of 
a pipeline and gas consumption per 1 km of a pipeline is the lowest in Poland due to “lack 
of capacity reserves especially in North-Western Poland and lack of network development 
in the North-Eastern Poland”, according to the document. While it is important to keep 
in mind that additional result of developments in gasification infrastructure would be in 
compliance with the EU requirements for more competitive internal market and cleaner 
fuels, the documents specifically mention security of supply as the motivation for these 
actions. 
Similarly, a comparison between existing and undertaken physical infrastructure 
to receive international gas exemplifies Polish limited capabilities. While other countries 
have access to fairly diversified sources, Poland is bounded to the Eastern source, 
according to the document. Polish connectors with Belarus and Ukraine that deliver 
“Russian gas and Asian gas transiting through Russia,” and a connector with Germany 
represent a bleak picture in respect to other countries’ variety of choice. Moreover, the 
German connector does not offer significant promise given most of the suppliers provide 
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Russian gas (Ministry of Economy 2007). As a result, the Ministry estimates that as of 
2006 “92% of the imported natural gas enters the system through the Eastern connectors 
and Yamal Pipeline, and the whole transmission network is oriented towards transferring 
gas from the East to the West” (Ministry of Economy 2007). 
 
III Over-reliance on Russia poses a possible threat 
Russian Federation indeed has had many advantages that positioned it well as the 
main supplier of gas for Poland. Its own massive reserves, geographical access, 
institutional conditions of the long history of reliability on gas from Russia, state of 
existing infrastructure with massive pipelines from the East all meant Poland will be 
dependent on Russia for quite a long time. An analysis of available data shows that while 
early diversification requirements were met, the existing preconditions did not provide 
much optimism towards maintaining the limit in the future. Similarly, the Ministry of 
Economy reports that the prospects were not sufficient to maintain energy security given 
“unfavorable structure of supply contracts” (Ministry of Economy 2007).  
Additionally, possible over-reliance on Russian gas raised if not red, than at least 
orange flags for policy makers given contemporary international developments. A 
government document “Energy Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020” from August 
28, 2003 states that one of the strategic interests of natural gas sector development is 
“securing Russian political interests in Europe and in the neighboring countries” (quoted 
in Ministry of Economy 2007). PNGI identifies state monopoly OAO Gazprom as the 
leading entity responsible for obtaining Russian goals, and suggests in the search of 
consumer markets the company could choose to omit transit countries like Poland, a 
strategy later materialized in Nord Stream 2 initiative (Ministry of Economy 2007). 
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The risks of over-relying on Russian gas materialized the fastest in supply 
disruptions, as exemplified by disputes with Ukraine in 2006, 2009 or issues with 
Belarus.9 Poland, as a recipient of gas from both of these directions suffered indirectly on 
multiple occasions (Collins 2017). 
 
IV Legislative response to the danger to Poland’s energy security  
Legislative changes that followed to address emergency situations only 
strengthened the salience of energy security. The Energy Emergency Action Board [Zespół 
ds. Działań w Sytuacjach Kryzysowych w Energetyce] was created in 2006, and following 
the EU directives: 73/238/EWG, and 2006/67/WE, Polish government prepared and 
passed a bill on inventory of crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas and procedures 
in emergency situations and disruption in the markets on February 16, 2007 (Bill on Oil 
Supplies… 2007). 
The legal framework created enabled government to intervene in the markets in 
case of a supply crisis. One of the most important instruments were obligatory 
intervention inventories under the government disposal. Poland finished building up 
levels of its petroleum inventories a year earlier than EU procedures required. Similarly, 
obligatory intervention inventories of natural gas, together with emergency procedures, 
were created. A target amount of inventories were supposed to be an equivalent of 30 days 
of daily import (Ministry of Economy 2009b). 
Moreover, introduction of the bill meant Poland met International Energy Agency 
criteria and could participate in coordinated support system between member countries 
in case of emergency managed by the IEA (Ministry of Economy 2009b). 
                                               
9 For rich literature on this see for instance Stern et al. 2009 
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V Evaluating alternatives to Russia on a pursuit to diversify 
As evidenced by introducing a series of laws on energy emergencies, policy makers 
demonstrated their awareness of consequences of insufficient energy security. PEP2030 
states that it is an “imperative” to increase capacities of gas transmission and storage 
systems. Moreover, increased extraction efforts are suggested as a way to satisfy current 
demand and increase long-term security (Ministry of Economy 2009a). How could those 
be achieved? According to the document through diversification of sources and channels 
of natural gas. 
According to Kaliski et al. (2010), from multiple projects considered as potential 
methods of diversification discusses since the 90s, only Lasow connector was delivered. 
It is a piece of infrastructure providing connection with Germany, and in the past also a 
point of entry for the gas from Norway. PEP 2030 first underscores the importance of 
economic feasibility of each single alternative, and then lists a whole array of possible 
projects:  
 
• “Adequate tariff policy encouraging investments in transmission and distribution 
infrastructure 
• Construction of LNG receiving terminal 
• Contracting at market prices diversified gas sources for the LNG terminal and from the 
northern direction  
• Creation of sustainable management policy of domestic gas supplies enabling expansion 
of natural gas reserves on the Polish territory 
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• Completion of investment projects enabling increased natural gas extraction on the 
Polish territory  
• Diversification of supply through creation of a transmission system accessible to North, 
West and South channels and creation of intersystemic connections fulfilling the 
diversification postulate in the first place 
• Obtaining access to foreign natural gas reserves by Polish companies 
• Support of the infrastructure investments with the EU funds 
• Improvement of crisis management mechanisms 
• Protection of national interest in strategic companies in the gas sector 
• Incentivizing storage magazine capacities investment (through an appropriate 
construction of tariffs and assurance of return on engaged capital) 
• Legislative actions targeting investment barriers, especially in respect to big 
infrastructure investments (storage magazines, LNG infrastructure, gas compression 
stations, etc. and pipeline investments) 
• Continuation of pilot program of sharing methane from coal” (Ministry of Economy, 
2009a).  
 
Interestingly enough, documents from the time do not mention pricing 
considerations. With that in mind, a possible additional research question would deal 
with the role of affordability in the terminal operating process, and the impact of global 
gas market transformations. One of the question that comes to mind is whether Poland 
would build the terminal and use if the shale revolution did not happen? With a limited 
global supply of LNG, and the demand factors in place, Poland would face a difficult time 
if competing financially for LNG with developing East Asia countries. Supposedly, 
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terminal would be built anyway but affordability criteria has to be met in order for the 
terminal to operate on a significant scale.  
The process that ultimately led to construction of an LNG receiving terminal in 
Poland was started in 2006. The unpublished resolution 3/2006 of the Council of 
Ministers aimed at diversification of Polish energy sources, and according to it, 
diversification of natural gas supply required specifically building an LNG terminal (SAO 
2013, Ministry of Economy 2009a). According to a Polish Press Agency release from the 
time, the terminal, together with securing supply from non-Russian sources, increased 
domestic production, and increased storage facilities were postulates neglected by the 
previous post-communist government. A 2001 deal with 5 Norwegian companies to 
supply 74 bcm of natural gas over 2008-2024 period was in fact cancelled in 2003. Mr. 
Marcinkiewicz, prime minister in 2006 called the inaction “scandalous and endangering 
Polish energy security” (PAP 2006). Asked about potential alternatives to Russian gas he 
mentioned potential northern direction, eastern direction, and south direction, citing Iraq 
as one of the possibilities.   
Despite the project’s branding as a key investment for the energy security, enabling 
imports from any country in the world, the legislative process did not gain much traction. 
Another unpublished resolution (77/2006) in May 2006 approved PGNiG SA preliminary 
actions to construct the terminal and transferred supervision to the Minister of the 
Economy (SAO 2013). An SPV Polskie LNG Sp z o.o. was created by PGNiG SA in 2007 to 
build and operate the terminal.  
The new government under the leadership of Donald Tusk, in an unpublished 
resolution from August 2008 moved the long-term supervisory authority to the Minister 
of the Treasury through transferring of 100% ownership of Polskie LNG to GAZ-SYSTEM 
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SA, occurring on December, 8 2008. In January the Ministry of Treasury approached the 
new owner and its subsidiary Polskie LNG to identify legislative solutions to speed up the 
process. According to the results of the Supreme Audit Office [Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli, 
NIK] control, no efficient legislative procedures were adopted until 2009. Change of a 
ruling coalition, focus on managing the reasonably healthy economy amid the Great 
Recession could be identified as leading to insufficient institutional design slowing the 
pace of developments. Among the institutional barriers, NIK highlights:  
● delays in realization of investment tasks by GAZ-SYSTEM and Polskie LNG, 
especially for two projects (Terminal LNG and Świnoujście-Szczecin pipeline),  
● conflict of interest by the Transport Technology Oversight Agency [Transportowy 
Dozor Techniczny],  
● Insufficient exercise of due diligence by a respective overseeing Minister of the 
Treasury 
● Ineffective coordination efforts by investment coordinator GAZ-SYSTEM, lacking 
necessary execution instruments  (Based on SAO 2013) 
The reasons for delay require further inquiry. One of the hypothesis could refer 
back to the affordability issue, with no potential sources of affordable supply, political will 
was not sufficient to justify next steps of the project. 
The delays increased financial risks. PGNiG could not accept LNG gas from 
Qatargas Operating Company Ltd. in early 2015 as it previously agreed to in contract 
terms, and given the Take-or-Pay clause negative financial consequences could not be 
mitigated. Moreover, prolonged delays increased the risk of losing the EU funds used to 
co-finance the investment (SAO 2013). 
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A bill “On investments in respect to Liquified Natural Gas Regasification Terminal” 
passed in the parliament on April 24, 2009, established the rules on preparation, 
realization and financing procedures of the investment and further contracts followed 
(Bill on Investments… 2009). 
 
 
C The terminal  
 
I Description of the investment 
The actual investment involved building the LNG receiving terminal and 
additional infrastructure: a new breakwater installation and expansion of the port basin 
system to allow for more space for LNG shipments, new wharf infrastructure to allow 
ships transporting LNG to dock, and lastly a high-pressure 80km-long transmission 
pipeline. Responsibilities were divided in the following way: Polskie LNG S.A. was 
responsible for the terminal part, The Szczecin and Swinoujscie Seaports Authority was 
handling the breakwater infrastructure, the Maritime Office in Szczecin was responsible 
for the wharf and docking improvements and Gaz System was put in charge of the new 
pipeline (EY 2013).  
 
II Financing  
Each actor was responsible for financing of their respective parts. The whole 
investment was estimated to cost 4.3 Bn PLN, and costs of the actual terminal were the 
highest, and were expected to amount to 2.8 Bn PLN. More detailed information is 
summarized in the table below: 
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Funding of the Investment    Table 5. 
Investment component Estimate of the funding 
required 
Source of funding 
Terminal 2.76 Bn PLN Gaz System 
recapitalization – 1 Bn 
PLN 
EU (Infrastructure and 
Environment Operational 
Program as part of the EU 
Cohesion Fund and 
European Energy Program 
for Recovery) – .77 Bn PLN 
 
Debt instruments – around 
1 Bn PLN including:  
 
EBRD – .3 Bn PLN loan 
 
EIB – up to .6 Bn PLN 
investment loan 
 
Consortium of 11 
commercial banks – 1 Bn 
EUR bond purchase 
program 
 
Breakwater and port basin 1.02 Bn PLN Governmental funding – 
undisclosed 
EU (Infrastructure and 
Environment Operational 
Program as part of the EU 
Cohesion Fund) – 
undisclosed 
Wharf .17 Bn PLN Maritime Office in 
Szczecin – undisclosed  
 
EU (European Energy 
Program for Recovery) – 
undisclosed  
Pipeline .32 Bn PLN Gaz System own funds – 
.16 Bn PLN 
 
EU (European Energy 
Program for Recovery) – 
.16 Bn PLN 
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Source: Based on: EY 2013 
 
These amounts were later adjusted to reflect the increased cost that in terms of the 
Terminal amounted to 3.64 Bn PLN, including .89 Bn PLN from the EU funds (according 
to Ministry of Development’s database accessible here: 
http://www.mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekt/1214687) 
 
III Construction  
After signing a contract with an Italian-French-Canadian-Polish consortium in 
July 2010, the cornerstone was laid on March 23, 2011 in an official ceremony and 
construction started. As mentioned above in the legislative section, a series of delay took 
place.10 In June 2012 three companies – members of the consortium bankrupted.11 While 
the first shipment was received in December 2015, the investment was officially finished 
and received operating permit in 2016, two years after the original date. 
 
8. Results 
 
A Diversification 
Analysis of diversification in respect to the country of import requires us to make 
a distinction between the direction and the country of origin. Natural gas comes to Poland 
through pipelines from Belarus, Ukraine, Czechia, and Germany. Overconcentration 
                                               
10 For more detailed information see SAO, 2013 
11 Oddly enough, the history of the investment section on the Polskie LNG website ends in 2011, and 
English version has accidentally a wrong date for one of the supervisory contracts: 
https://en.polskielng.pl/pl/lng-terminal/lng-terminal-in-swinoujscie/history-of-the-investment/ last accessed 
on 5/6/2019 
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poses the biggest threat: “import from one direction from one provider of gas from one 
country is the least diverse and the most dangerous threat to energy security” (Zawisza 
2011).  
While reporting imports, PGNiG specifies directions, however not the country of 
origin of gas. Based on current contracts however, it is with high probability that we say 
that gas coming from the southern and western directions is also Gazprom gas. This fact 
is also accounted for in the diversification requirements outlined in the Energy Law 
(1997). The bill contains a fascinating caveat. While the requirements include LNG and 
reverse flows from other EU countries in total natural gas calculations, these two sources 
are exempt from the diversification requirement, in fact seemingly decreasing “formal” 
dependence on Russian gas as long as it is provided by an EU country in the form of a 
reverse flow.  
Analysis of the data is very informative for the impact of LNG. First, let us delve 
into overall gas supply. Altogether, gas supply rose in line with the projections presented 
in PEP2030 (Ministry of Economy 2009). While 2014 and 2015 showed lower demand 
than expected, 2016 results were almost equal to 2015 prognosis. Reaching 2020 target 
in 2017 may be a result of income effect of lower gas prices.   
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Total Natural Gas Supply in Poland  GRAPH 3. 
 
Source: Based on PGNiG annual reports  
   
Actual Natural Gas Supply vs PEP2030 projections 
 TABLE 6. 
 2010 2015 2018 2020 2025 2030 
Actual 
Natural Gas 
Supply 
14.2 
 
13.4 17.3 N/A N/A N/A 
PEP 2030 
projection 
14.1 15.4 N/A 17.1 19 20.2 
Source: Based on: PGNiG annual reports and Ministry of Energy 2009c 
 
PEP assumed meeting specific policy objections to meet the rising demand (Kaliski 
et al. 2010). Some of these policies were not fulfilled. The supply from western direction 
exceeded the goal of 0.5 bcm per year from 2012 on, however the same cannot be said 
about the southern direction that met 0.5 bcm per year goal only in 2012 and 2013. 
Additionally, LNG supplies started with a 2 year delay in 2016. 
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Natural Gas Supply from Western and Southern Directions, Actual vs Expected 
GRAPH 4. 
 
Source: Based on: PGNIG annual reports, Ministry of Economy 2009, Ministry of 
Economy 2009c, Kaliski et al. 2010 
 
Overall LNG supplies have been increasing steadily. Since the first transport 
arrived in 2016, with the full year data available until the end of 2018, Polish LNG import 
experienced 64% yoy CAGR growth. LNG’s role in total gas supply constituted 15.6%, a 
significant rise from 6.5% in total gas supply mix 2 years earlier.   
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LNG vs Non-LNG Gas Supply, bcm  GRAPH 5. 
 
Source: Based on: PGNiG annual reports 
 
 Accounting for the definition based on the direction, not country of origin, Poland 
was not able to meet its diversification requirement from 2000 for any of the analyzed 
year. Moreover, it was not able to meet its updated and less strict diversification 
requirement from 2017 for any of the analyzed year until 2018, although it barely missed 
the target in 2017. These facts prove on one side that the minima were binding, on the 
other the inability to meet the goal. The 2018 change in trend is optimistic, and a question 
that should be posed is: is it a result of the LNG terminal? Redoing the calculation without 
LNG in the mix gives us the share of gas from the eastern direction at a level of 83.3% in 
the year 2018, pointing out that LNG terminal played a crucial role in increasing 
diversification as understood by Polish law.12 While there is a still long way to go to 
comply with the more ambitious requirements, the LNG terminal fulfilled its function and 
its rate of growth is a source of optimism towards meeting stricter minima in the future. 
                                               
12 This method is based on a very conservative assumption that in the absence of LNG, Polish private 
and business consumers would simply limit their energy demand rather than increase the amount 
imported from Russia.  
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Given political announcements of not entering talks with Russia on new gas contract after 
2022, the decision to expand the terminal’s capacity by 50% from 5 bcm to 7.5 bcm, 
should not come as a surprise.13  
Natural Gas in Poland   GRAPH 6. 
 
Source: Based on: PGNiG annual reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Moreover, other diversification initiatives are currently discussed, including the Baltic Pipe and possibly 
an FSRU unit in Gdansk, although the plans on the second one are still in an early phase and some 
concepts suggest using it for transportation purposes. 
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Diversification Requirements vs Actual Diversification GRAPH 7. 
 
Source: Based on: PGNiG annual reports, Council of Ministers, 2000; 2017 
 
Diversification Requirements vs Actual Diversification vs Diversification without 
LNG in the mix         TABLE 7. 
 2016 2017 2018 
2000 Requirement 59% 59% 59% 
2017 Requirement N/A 70% 70% 
Actual Diversification 88.7% 70.8% 66.67% 
Diversification w/o 
LNG 
97.14% 80.83% 83.33% 
Source: Based on PGNiG annual reports, Council of Ministers, 2000; 2017 
 
Lastly, additionally to analyzing the dependence on the biggest importer, it is 
worth looking at the overall dependence on imports of gas supplies. While the total share 
of imports in the gas mix was historically fluid depending on a variety of factor, it tended 
to fluctuate around the stable 70% line. Since 2015 however, the dependence on imports 
significantly increased. Again, a question that should be posed is following: is it a result 
of the LNG terminal? When redoing the calculation without including the LNG in the mix 
we see that dependence on imports grew anyway, however to a lesser extent.14 It could 
                                               
14 The same hypothetical conservative scenario based on an assumption from the previous paragraph. 
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possibly be explained by the income effect with energy being cheaper overall and the effect 
further strengthened by potentially cheaper than other sources LNG, however this 
hypothesis needs a further academic inquiry.  
Dependence on Natural Gas Imports  GRAPH 7. 
 
Source: Based on PGNiG annual reports 
 
To summarize, the LNG terminal has helped achieving the diversification 
requirements as specified by Polish law, something unseen since the introduction of 
diversification minima in 2000. However, it is worth noting that overall dependence on 
imports has increased and LNG supplies, potentially through the income effect 
mechanism, have contributed to this phenomenon. With developing Polish economy and 
growing energy and specifically natural gas demand, it is highly unlikely that the trend of 
import dependence will turn, and hence affordability and reliability will become 
increasingly important to ensure the long-term energy security. 
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B Affordability 
An informative assessment of the impact of LNG terminal in Swinoujscie on 
affordability of Polish gas supplies is a challenging task. The most important reference 
point - gas prices paid for Russian gas is difficult to estimate. Particular clauses of the 
Yamal Contract for Russian gas delivery from 1996 until 2022 were never made public. 
While the general formula was standardized and, as for other countries, indexed to crude 
oil prices, there is a consensus that price conditions were unfavorable for Poland, despite 
its relatively big market potentially suggesting discounts like in the German case. Another 
factor was also significant overestimation of the actual Polish gas consumption, expected 
to reach 27-35 bcm by 2010, whereas the actual consumption amounted to 14.4 bcm. 
Moreover, the contract also included 85% take-or-pay clause and the ban on reexport of 
the gas Poland committed to buy (Zawisza 2011). Additionally, based on a NIK report, 
there was no negotiating instruction prepared for the Polish side.15 The European 
Commission antitrust investigation found that Poland was one of the 5 EU member states 
where Gazprom successfully managed to “partition gas markets along national borders” 
and as a result charge higher gas prices (EC 2018). 
Based on Russian agencies’ releases and estimations, experts tried to arrive at as 
close to the actual prices paid by Poland for the Russian gas. When contrasted with the 
main reference gas price in the US: Henry Hub, there is a significant premium charged by 
Gazprom. According to Mikulska, 2018 “Even if the price at HH rises to the upper bond 
of EIA predicted levels (approx. $5 per million Btu), U.S. LNG could still compete with 
prices that Gazprom charged Poland through most of the 2010s (see Table 8.).” 
                                               
15 For more information on procedural flaws and discussion on potential loss of transit fees see SAO, 
2004 
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Gazprom vs Henry Hub price differentials  TABLE 8. 
 
 Source: Mikulska, 2018 
 
Similarly, the new LNG contracts do not provide full public information on 
contract structures and prices. First of all it is worth noting that in terms of regasification 
price, it is already borne by PGNiG anyways. Given the company reserved 100% of the 
terminal’s capabilities, the more contracts it delivers the lower per Btu cost of 
regasification. There have been attempts to estimate other price components. Some 
contracts arouse more attention and estimations from the market experts, and these 
divagations can be nonetheless informative. Experts wrote excessively about new for 
Poland spot-based pricing structure in the Centrica agreements, achieved mostly as a 
result of opening the effective PGNiG’s London trading office headed Ireneusz Łazor 
(Jakobik, 2017b). According to some estimates, Centrica’s contract for the American gas 
should cost around $150 per 1000 cm that needs to be adjusted for transport and 
liquefaction cost. It remains unclear who bears the aforementioned types of costs, 
potentially increasing the price from around $4.10-$4.26 per mmBtu (or $151.29-$157.19 
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per 1000cm) to $7.47 per mmBtu ($275.64 per 1000cm).16 However, other authors point 
out to subsequent fall in Centrica’s share price and reports that the price formula may be 
indexed do one of the European exchanges instead, the fact praised as a Copernicus 
break-through for the Polish gas market (Jakobik, 2017a). Moreover, to get rid of supply 
glut, there is a possibility that the company did not include liquefaction cost to make the 
oversupplied resource more attractive, leaning to a final price of around $150 per 
1000cm. As Jakobik (2017b) points out, this price is lower than average Gazprom price 
presented, and given the unfairness of treatment of the Polish buyer that led to case before 
the arbitrage court, the expected difference between American and Russian gas can be 
even bigger in favor of the LNG.”  
Improving the negotiating position is happening through yet another channel. 
More recent contracts have been signed for receiving gas from terminals that are not even 
under construction, like Port Arthur LNG or Venture Global LNG. To account for more 
risk they carry, including possible delays and lack of approval from the regulatory site, 
such deals possibly offer better price conditions and enable PGNiG to enjoy exercising 
anchor pricing strategy.17  
More recent data shows that this beneficial relationship between Russian and 
American prices have been maintained and was not just a result of the PR importance of 
the first transaction as Sikora and Sikora (2017) expected. The EIA data on exports to 
Poland provides us with stable price differential in favor of the gas exported to Poland 
from the US when compared to average Gazprom price. 
                                               
16 As a result of adding around $3.5 per 1000mmBtu for liquefaction costs and standard Chenerie formula 
including 115% of Henry Hub price - see Sikora and Sikora, 2017 and Maciazek, 2017 
17 For more on the strategy see Mikulska 2019, PGNiG commentary on the regulatory approval of Port 
Arthur LNG project available here: PGNiG 2019 http://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/federal-permit-for-
port-arthur-lng/newsGroupId/1910852 
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USA (based on LNG exports to Poland) vs Russian Gas Prices TABLE 9.  
 November 2018 January 2019 
USA, Cove Point (3,231 
mmBTUs provided) (in 
USD) 
7.12  
USA, Sabine Pass (9,762 
mmBTUs provided) (in 
USD) 
 7.00 
Russian Natural Gas 
Average Monthly Price (in 
USD) 
8.27 7.29 
Source: Based on: EIA data and WorldBank data available here: 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/ngm_epg0_png_nus-npl_dmcfm.htm and here: 
https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=russian-natural-
gas&months=12 
 
Interestingly enough, Polish and international media have witnessed waves of 
articles against the new directions right around signing the new contracts, especially 
before recent shift of Russia towards developing its own LNG infrastructure. Most 
prominent lines of reasoning in those articles pointed out to higher prices, mainly political 
motives, US inability to export its gas and instead reexporting Russian gas to Poland by 
American companies. They quoted experts who cannot be seen as independent: like Klaus 
Schefer, a CEO of German Uniper involved in Nord Stream 2 negotiations. Some thought 
leaders in the field saw it as evidence of Russian disinformation campaign and a case in 
point proving price competitiveness of new agreements.18  
Additionally, Mikulska makes an argument according to which - given increasing 
energy security in other areas (namely, diversification and reliability) is strategic from the 
geopolitical point of view - a premium price can be paid for it. In other words, gas can be 
more expensive as long as it comes from another source than Russia. And Polish society, 
used to paying high gas prices, is ready to accept it (Mikulska 2018).  
                                               
18 For examples see for instance: New Cold War 2015 
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Given lack of information, it is impossible to give a full and fair assessment of 
impact on LNG Terminal in Swinoujscie on affordability of Polish natural gas. Statements 
like those of PGNiG leadership or Ministry of Energy representatives that “LNG supplies 
are cheaper than Gazprom deal by about 20-30%” have to be taken at face value, and it is 
impossible to verify whether the actual cost of dependence on Russian gas between 2001-
2018 was closer to 50 or 100 Bn PLN (Wozniak 2019 and Naimski 2019). Hence the most 
important conclusion is the need for transparency in the market, and the United States’ 
Department of energy may provide a valuable benchmark. Secrecy problem aside, 
available pieces of information and estimates from the market experts hint at possible 
positive price effect. Moreover, Poland seems to act in a way to secure an advantageous 
negotiating position, further implying the affordability should be happening. Potentially, 
intense information campaign against new LNG contracts from Russian sources could 
also confirm this direction of thought. Lastly, it is worth noting that if other energy 
security conditions are fulfilled, Polish society may be willing to pay a “security premium” 
for non-Russian gas.  
 
C Reliability 
According to PGNiG (2019) the only long-term existing contract on pipeline 
natural gas is Yamal, supplying 10.2 bcm annually, with 85% Take-or-Pay clause. So far 
the Swinoujscie LNG terminal has received LNG from Qatar, Norway and the US. They 
are based on long-term contracts with Qatargas, long-term contract with Cheniere, 
medium-term contract with a British firm Centrica, and spot contracts. Moreover, two 
more contracts are currently signed for non-operating US-based liquefaction facilities.  
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- “Contract for LNG with Qatargas until 2034: 
1.3 bcm annually, 100% Take-or-Pay. Deliveries since June 2016 side agreement (the total 
volume will increase to 2.7 bcm per annum, in 2018-2020 volume will be increased to 2.9 
bcm) 
- Contract for LNG with Cheniere until 2042: 
0.73 bcm in the period of 2019-2022 
1.95 bcm annualy in the period of 2023-2042 
- Contracts for LNG with Venture Global and Port Arthur: 
2.7bcm annually each. Deliveries since2022 (at the earliest) until 2043” (all cited from 
PGNiG, 2019) 
Such diverse structure of suppliers and types of contracts naturally contributes to 
reliability. While currently the great majority of them is based on DES clause, PGNiG has 
already secured greater diversity in this field when the already signed contracts with new 
companies will be implemented. As Mikulska points out, diversification of suppliers, 
contract arrangements and flexibility of these contracts strengthens Polish energy 
security and is beneficial from the economic point of view (Mikulska 2019). 
The mix of countries provides increased reliability from political perspective. 
While Qatar, US, and Norway do not necessarily align every strategic priority with each 
other and with Polish geopolitical interest, having different partners, with none of them 
being as potentially willing to engage energy policy to exercise their political interest in 
CEE to a level comparable to the Russian Federation is a great advantage. LNG could be 
seen as a way to strengthen the bonds between economies and countries, idea especially 
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present in the current context of the US-EU relationship.19 However, as pointed out by 
some experts, US companies in the field are independent private companies that follow 
economic motives more than any governmental purpose, and are as such very different 
than their Russian counterpart or even a State-owned PGNiG (Mikulska 2019) 
To assess reliability, further, I follow the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) two main Market Health metrics (ACER 2018). The first criterion is 
whether the member state has at least three geographical-supply sources of origin 
(Heiskala and Aro 2018). Poland passes this test, even without including the reverse 
flows, with supply of gas from Russia, Qatar, US and Norway.  
The second metric is Residual Supply Index. The RSI must be over 110% - after 
excluding your biggest supplier (Russia in that case) a country must ensure it can provide 
110% of its actual demand. Apart from an intellectual exercise, the RSI can actually be 
informative regarding the feasibility of a potential non-renewal option when the current 
contract with Russia expires in 2022. For the most recent 2018 values no matter whether 
we include the reverse flows or not, after excluding Russia supplies and adding 2017 gas 
storage facilities of 3.2 mm BTU, Poland is not able to meet the 110% RSI requirement, 
its RSI values equals to 66% with reverse flows and 56% without reverse flows. In the case 
when Polish energy needs remain unchanged, but LNG capabilities raise to 7.5 mm BTU, 
the RSI values are respectively 94% and 84%. Adding assumption that as a result of 
development of Gdansk FSRU all LNG contracted capabilities from 2024 are available 
and are supplied to the Polish transmission system rather than being reexported, the new 
RSI values are: 109% and 99%. While the last assumption seems the most unrealistic, and 
                                               
19 President Trump and EC President Juncker agreed to facilitate more US exports of LNG to the EU, see 
EC 2019a 
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based on current PGNiG projections it will not be fulfilled until at least 2024, LNG cannot 
by itself replace Russian gas.  
If Poland wants to make sure its supply sources are reliable, the Baltic Pipe project 
seems the most fitting. This could provide up to 10 mmBTU of natural gas from Norway, 
and as such would mean RSI of 152% and 142% for 7.5 mmBTU of LNG and fixed 2018 
demand. 
Additionally, the original ACER recommendation is actual assessment of RSI at a 
regional rather than a country level. While it includes an assumption that the regional gas 
markets are interconnected, energy union has long been discussed in the European 
decision making centers and it remains to be seen whether these discussion will 
materialize in increased investment after 2019 European Parliament elections. Apart 
from necessary investment, one of the challenges ahead of the interconnected markets is 
a phenomenon present in the Polish market system. Despite unbundling, the market is 
still dominated by state-owned enterprises that often like in case of PGNiG may fully 
appropriate the new infrastructure: contract for 100% of the Swinoujscie terminal 
capacities. As Mikulska points out “liberalizing access to countries’ natural gas 
infrastructure could benefit efforts to enhance market integration” (Mikulska, working 
paper). 
Moreover, while thinking about reliability of supplies, a move away from Russia 
may lead to an unexpected impact of Poland’s policy of diversification. While Poland 
could simply limit its exposure to Russia and benefit from its current, LNG-enhanced 
competitive negotiating position, and demand competitive prices as Lithuania did, 
current Polish government seems strongly opposed to the idea of letting Russian economy 
benefit. Interestingly enough, as Mikulska points out, such a move would decrease the 
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whole region’s dependence on Russia: “if Poland wants to achieve security supply and 
contribute to the security within the Baltic region, its move away from Russian gas can 
help. In addition, given Germany’s affinity for Russian gas, Poland may become a crucial 
element of balancing the region’s dependence” (Mikulska, working paper). 
In summary, LNG terminal increased reliability through introducing Polish gas 
market to diversity of contract lengths and type and supplies from more countries with 
all of them less willing to exercise political pressure in the CEE region than Russia and 
especially USA and Norway generally more strategically aligned with Polish interests. 
Following ACER market Health metrics provides deepens the quality of reliability 
analysis, showing that Poland meets a 3-country criterion yet is able to meet RCI index 
only under a set of unrealistic assumptions. In order to fully become independent from 
Russian supplies, Baltic Pipe initiative should be pursued.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
As a result of changes in the global gas market, LNG became a viable option for 
many. Poland is one of the beneficiary of this transformation. A country long realizing the 
urgent calling to diversify, it was not able to do so in an economically competitive way. 
With the shale gas revolution and technological transformation, and aided by the EU 
funding, Poland pursued an LNG receiving terminal project. Operating since 2016, the 
Swinoujscie terminal led to partial diversification of gas supplies: reliance on Russian gas 
decreased while the reliance on imports increased slightly as a result of the terminal. 
While the affordability aspect cannot be confirmed fully, it seems safe to assume that 
contracts signed so far have not been worse than contemporary deal with Gazprom, and 
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based on various estimates from different sources it seems possible that 20-30% savings 
on new contracts when compared to the cost of Yamal gas can be trusted more than a 
typical political promise. Lastly, as a result of increased diversity in types, duration and 
countries of suppliers of the contracts, reliability of gas has also increased. Overall, 
despite short time since starting operations, creation of the LNG terminal in Swinoujscie 
has already increased Polish energy security. But to more fully meet international 
recommendations on energy security, more integrated pannational gas markets should 
be promoted and conscious liberalization in energy markets should be encouraged. In 
addition, other energy security oriented-projects should be carefully evaluated and 
pursued if they indeed facilitate market integration and energy security objectives.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
